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II. RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
A. Exclusive Use Of Name And Likeness
1. Commercial Exploitation Of A Celebrity's Identity: Johnny
Carson Unseats Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.
Here's Johnny! That familiar phrase had its day in court in Carson
v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.' in which entertainer Johnny Car-
son successfully established his exclusive right to the magic words. The
Sixth Circuit held that a portable toilet company had infringed Carson's
right of publicity2 by using the phrase without Carson's permission.
Appearing as plaintiff and appellant was John W. Carson ("Car-
son"), better known to television audiences as Johnny Carson, the host of
"The Tonight Show." For more than twenty years, Carson has been in-
troduced with the phrase "Here's Johnny" on his program aired on the
National Broadcasting Company ("NBC") network.3 The introduction
is usually given by Ed McMahon and is said in a distinctive way, empha-
sizing and prolonging the word "here's."' Prior to the suit, the phrase
had never been registered as a trademark or service mark.5
Joining Carson as plaintiff was Johnny Carson Apparel, Inc., a man-
ufacturer and marketer of men's clothing. Johnny Carson was the presi-
dent of the clothing firm and owned twenty percent of its stock. The firm
used the phrase "Here's Johnny" on its clothing labels and in its advertis-
ing. In 1977, the clothing company granted a license to Marcy Laborato-
ries to use "Here's Johnny" for a brand of men's cologne and similar
products. Additionally, in 1967, Carson had authorized the use of the
1. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) (per Brown, J.; Kennedy, J., dissenting).
2. The right of publicity was defined in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953): "A man has a right in the publicity value of his
photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture .... This
right might be called a 'right of publicity.'"
In a more recent attempt to define the right, it has been noted that, "It is more accurate to
think of it as a sui generis mixture of personal rights, property rights, and rights under the law
of unfair competition than to attempt, Procrustean-like, to fit it precisely into one of those
categories." Hoffman, Limitations on the Right of Publicity, 28 BULL. COPR. SOC'Y 111, 112
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Hoffman]. See generally Note, The Right of Publicity: Protection
for Public Figures and Celebrities, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 527 (1976).
3. Carson, 698 F.2d at 832.
4. Id. at 838.
5. Id. at 833. See Ames Publishing Co. v. Walker-Davis Publications, Inc., 372 F. Supp.
I (E.D. Pa. 1974) (holding that trademark protections can be invoked even if the mark has not
been formally registered); Interstate Brands Corp. v. Way Baking Co., 79 Mich. App. 551, 261
N.W.2d 84 (1977) (trademark rights must grow out of usage; mere formal registration is
insufficient).
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phrase for a chain of restaurants known as "Here's Johnny
Restaurants."6
The defendant and appellant, Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.,
("the company"), was a Michigan corporation engaged in the renting,
selling, and servicing of portable toilets. Its founder, Earl Braxton, said
he was aware when he formed the corporation that the phrase "Here's
Johnny" was associated with Carson and was used on "The Tonight
Show." Braxton said he intended to use the name as a play on words.7
He also indicated that his advertising coupled that phrase with another,
"The World's Foremost Commodian," to make a play on the word
"comedian." 8
In 1976, Carson sued the company, alleging unfair competition,
trademark infringement, and invasion of the rights of privacy and public-
ity. The plaintiffs sought damages and an injunction prohibiting the
company from using "Here's Johnny" in connection with its business.9
After a bench trial, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan issued a memorandum opinion and order. The dis-
trict court dismissed Carson's complaint."0 In regard to the claims of
unfair competition and trademark infringement, the court held that Car-
son had failed to satisfy the "likelihood of confusion" test. 1' Regarding
the right of privacy and right of publicity, the district court held that
those rights extend only to a "name" or "likeness," and the phrase
"Here's Johnny" did not qualify. 2
6. Carson, 698 F.2d at 833.
7. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 71, 75 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
The district court noted: "[U]se of the word john' within the portable toilet trade is custom-
ary. . . . For example, some of the Michigan-based portable toilet companies carry the names
of 'Johnny On the Spot,' 'Porta-John,' and 'Tote-a-Jon.'"
8. Carson, 698 F.2d at 833.
9. Id.
10. Id. Although Carson's case was dismissed in the district court, the entertainer pre-
vailed in a similar trademark suit filed in Canada at approximately the same time. In Carson
v. Reynolds, 2 F.C. 685 (1980), Carson appealed a decision by the Registrar of Trade Marks to
register "Here's Johnny" to William A. Reynolds as a trade name for portable toilets. On
appeal to the Federal Court of Canada, the court found that a significant number of people in
that country associated the phrase, "Here's Johnny," with Johnny Carson. The Canadian
federal court held that under the Trade Marks Act the phrase could not be registered without
Carson's consent. 2 F.C. at 690.
11. Carson, 698 F.2d at 833. See Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy of Steuben-
ville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 647 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982). In determining
if a trademark has been infringed, the court held that only the likelihood of confusion must be
shown, not actual confusion.
12. Carson, 698 F.2d at 833. In describing the right of publicity, Dean Prosser extends it




On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that
the likelihood of confusion test had not been met for trademark infringe-
ment and unfair competition. Applying federal trademark law 3 and
Michigan common law, 4 the court examined several factors that must be
balanced to determine if there was a likelihood of confusion. I" The court
noted that establishing the various factors is a question of fact, while the
weighing of those factors is a question of law.
16
The Carson court agreed with the district court, stating that "Here's
Johnny" was not such a strong mark that its use for other purposes was
entirely forbidden. The district court had emphasized that the com-
pany's use of the phrase "Here's Johnny" for its toilets was completely
unrelated to Carson's use of the phrase on his television program and by
the clothing company. 7 Although the toilet company intended to gain a
benefit from the phrase, it did not intend to deceive the public into believ-
ing that Carson was involved with its business. There was no evidence
that the public had actually confused Carson with the company. Nor
was there evidence that the company's use of the phrase had actually
13. Carson, 698 F.2d at 833. Any person knowing that an article carries a false description
of origin, and who causes that article to be used in commerce, is liable to any person who
believes he is damaged by that false description or representation. The Lanham Trade-Mark
Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976).
14. The court cited Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670
F.2d 642, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982) (likelihood of confusion test met where defendant
advertised its restaurant franchise in plaintiff's exclusive marketing area) and Wills v. Alpine
Valley Ski Area, Inc., 369 Mich. 23, 118 N.W.2d 954 (1963) (Michigan plaintiff failed to show
likelihood of confusion between his ski and sport shop and the defendant ski area which was
twenty miles away). Although none of the parties relied on Michigan statutes, a state's corpo-
ration law may apply. The law requires that a corporation's name not be the same or confus-
ingly similar to the name of a foreign corporation authorized to transact business in the state.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1212 (West 1973). The statute conceivably could be used
against the toilet company by Johnny Carson Apparel, Inc., a New York corporation, which
used "Here's Johnny" in its advertisements.
15. The court in Frisch's Restaurants examined the following factors to determine if there
was a likelihood of confusion:
1. strength of plaintiff's mark;
2. relatedness of the goods;
3. similarity of the marks;
4. evidence of actual confusion;
5. marketing channels used;
6. likely degree of purchaser care;
7. defendant's intent in selecting the mark;
8. likelihood of expansion of the product line.
670 F.2d at 648.
16. Carson, 698 F.2d at 833.
17. Id. at 833-34. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema Ltd., 604
F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979) (defendant's pornographic movie, "Debbie Does Dallas," could hurt
the plaintiff cheerleaders' reputation even though the parties' activities were not related).
1985]
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damaged Carson." After considering these factors, the court agreed
with the district court that the use of the phrase "Here's Johnny" would
not support an action for trademark infringement or unfair competition.
The court also affirmed the district court's finding that Carson's
right of privacy had not been invaded. 19 The court agreed with the plain-
tiff that being associated with a toilet company "does not appeal to Car-
son's sense of humor," but it found no facts to suggest that the
company's use of the phrase had invaded Carson's privacy.2"
The court next turned to the issue of the right of publicity:
The right of publicity was developed to protect the com-
mercial interest of celebrities in their identities. The theory of
the right is that a celebrity's identity can be valuable in the pro-
motion of products, and the celebrity has an interest that may
be protected from the unauthorized commercial exploitation of
that identity.21
The court noted that the district court had dismissed Carson's claim
based on the right of publicity because the company had not used Car-
son's name or likeness.22 However, the court found that the district
court's view of the right was too narrow. "If the celebrity's identity is
commercially exploited, there has been an invasion of his right whether
or not his 'name or likeness' is used. Carson's identity may be exploited
18. Carson, 698 F.2d at 834.
19. Id. Dean Prosser has identified four types of invasion of privacy: (1) intrusion upon
one's seclusion or solitude; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing facts; (3) publicity that places
one in a false light; and (4) appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name
or likeness. The first three represent the right "to be let alone;" the fourth has helped defined
the right of publicity. Privacy, supra note 12, at 389.
20. Carson, 698 F.2d at 834. A news story that appeared during the district court trial
quoted Carson as saying: "It's an embarrassing association .... People thinking that you
might be involved in association with a toilet will make jokes about it." Long Beach Press-
Telegram, Sept. 5, 1980, at A2, col. 5. Another news story appearing at the time of the appel-
late hearing was headlined: "Johnny turned off by bathroom humor." Long Beach Press-
Telegram, May 28, 1982, at A2, col. 1. These reports, widely disseminated by the Associated
Press, suggest that Carson may have suffered an invasion of privacy.
21. Carson, 698 F.2d at 835. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S.
562 (1976) ("human cannonball" had right of publicity that was protected against unauthor-
ized broadcast of his act on television news program); Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors, Etc.,
Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980) (Elvis Presley held exclusive right to use of his name and
personality during his lifetime).
22. Ironically, Carson had lost a previous suit over the use of his name and photograph
because the jurisdiction did not recognize the right of publicity. In Carson v. National Bank of
Commerce Trust & Say., 501 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir. 1974), the defendant bank's travel agency
had advertised a "Nebraskan's Johnny Carson Tour of Las Vegas." The trip included tickets
to a Carson show in Las Vegas. Although the advertisement used Carson's name and photo-
graph without his permission, the court found no violation because Nebraska common law did
not recognize the right of publicity.
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
even if his name, John W. Carson, or his picture is not used."
2 3
The court noted that the company's president admitted he knew the
phrase "Here's Johnny" was used by Carson, and that the company
chose its name because of the identification with Carson. The court
found that this showed the company had appropriated Carson's "iden-
tity" to promote its own corporate name and product. The court held
that the right did not depend on Carson's full name being used.24
"[T]here would have been no violation of his right of publicity even if
appellee had used his name, such as 'J. William Carson Portable Toilet'
[ . . t]hough literally using appellant's 'name,' the appellee would not
have appropriated Carson's identity as a celebrity. Here there was an
appropriation of Carson's identity without using his 'name.' "25
In discussing the policy reasons supporting its decision, the court
noted that Carson's achievements have a value and will be protected by
the right of publicity. Protecting that right encourages achievement by
others in Carson's chosen field of entertainment. Protecting the right
also prevents unjust enrichment by others who seek to exploit Carson's
success without his consent.
26
To support its broader interpretation of the right of publicity, the
court looked to three cases that expanded the right of publicity beyond
the plaintiff's name or likeness.
In Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. ,27 the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the plaintiff's right of publicity extended to a photograph of
the plaintiff's racing car, which was used without permission in the de-
fendant's television commercial. The defendant had altered some of the
car's features28 and the plaintiff, race car driver Lothar Motschenbacher,
was not identifiable in the picture. However, the picture showed the dis-
tinctive colors of Motschenbacher's car. "These markings were not only
peculiar to the plaintiff's cars, but they caused some persons to think the
car in question was plaintiff's and to infer that the person driving the car
was the plaintiff."29 The court held that although Motschenbacher's
23. Carson, 698 F.2d at 835.
24. Id. at 836. In the wake of the circuit court ruling, Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.
changed its name. In 1984, the firm was doing business in Michigan under the name
"Johnny's Here." (Based on September, 1984 telephone calls to defendant's business office.)
25. Id. at 837.
26. Id. For a discussion of the policy reasons behind the right of publicity, see generally
Hoffman, supra note 2, at 116-19.
27. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
28. Id. at 822. On the photograph of the plaintiff's racing car, the defendant had changed
the car's number from "11" to "71;" the defendant also added a spoiler device bearing the
name of its product.
29. Id. at 827.
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name or likeness was not directly used, Motschenbacher's identity via the
car could be protected.
In Ali v. Playgirl, Inc.,3" the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that boxer Muhammad Ali's right
to publicity had been violated by the unauthorized publication of a draw-
ing in Playgirl magazine. The drawing showed a figure resembling Ali,
seated in the comer of a boxing ring. Although the drawing was cap-
tioned "Mystery Man," the accompanying verse referred to the figure in
the drawing as "The Greatest," Ali's nickname. The drawing plus the
use of the phrase "The Greatest" was sufficient to allow the court to
conclude that Ali's right to publicity had been invaded. Like the facts in
Carson, a phrase was protected, but in Al, the phrase was used in con-
junction with a drawing.
In Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. ,31 the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin held that football player Elroy Hirsch, known during his career as
"Crazylegs," could protect his right to publicity when the defendant
manufacturer began marketing a shaving gel for women's legs under the
name "Crazylegs." The manufacturer did not seek Hirsch's permission
to use the name. The court held that the fact that "Crazylegs" was
Hirsch's nickname and not his real name did not preclude a cause of
action. "All that is required is that the name clearly identify the
wronged person . . . . It is argued that there were others who were
known by the same name. This, however, does not vitiate the existence
of a cause of action." 32 The Hirsch court extended the right of publicity
closer to the facts in Carson. In Hirsch, the fact that there may be many
people known as "Crazylegs" did not defeat the plaintiff's claim. Like-
wise, the use of the common first name in "Here's Johnny" did not prove
fatal to Carson's claim.
The dissenting opinion in Carson, while recognizing that there is a
right to publicity, said that the right should not be extended beyond an
individual's name, likeness, achievements, identifying characteristics, or
actual performances. According to the dissent, the phrase "Here's
Johnny" was not within those boundaries.33 The use of the name
"Johnny" in the phrase is such a common name that "it is meaningless
or ambiguous at best in identifying Johnny Carson, the celebrity."34
The dissent next outlined some policy problems raised by the major-
30. 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
31. 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979).
32. Id. at 384, 240 N.W.2d at 137.
33. 698 F.2d at 837.
34. Id. at 838.
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ity's opinion. The dissent noted three basic policy considerations that
support a broad reading of the right of publicity."
First, protecting publicity rights permits celebrities to profit from
the fame they have created. This recognizes that a celebrity's name and
likeness have a pecuniary value that can be protected. But the dissent
said that in Carson's case, the phrase "Here's Johnny" was not part of
any identity that Carson himself created. The phrase was merely a sim-
ple and common introduction. The phrase was not said by Carson, but
was said by someone else of him. 6
The company used the phrase "outside the context" in which it was
used by Carson, basing its use on the double entendre value of the word
"john" as a term for a toilet. Therefore, the dissent found, it "does little
to rob Johnny Carson of something which is unique to him or a product
of his own efforts."
3 7
Second, the right of publicity provides a financial incentive for indi-
viduals to expend the time and resources to produce intellectual and cre-
ative works. These benefits eventually expand from the individuals to
benefit society at large. Others viewing Carson's success may be en-
couraged to enter the entertainment field themselves, knowing that
whatever fame they create will be protected.3 8 But in this case, the dis-
sent said, Carson would be receiving a windfall. Since Carson neither
created the phrase "Here's Johnny" nor performed it, he gained an eco-
nomic reward for the time, effort and work of someone else.39
Third, the right of publicity prevents unjust enrichment. The celeb-
rity who expends time and effort in creative pursuits will be protected
against outsiders attempting to reap what the celebrity has sown. The
dissent said that the company may be enriched by the use of the phrase
"Here's Johnny," but this enrichment is not at Carson's expense because
35. Id. See Hoffman, supra note 2, at 116: "The scope of the right of publicity ought to be
delineated with policy considerations in mind."
36. Carson, 698 F.2d at 839. The dissent wrote: "Ed McMahon [Carson's announcer]
arguably has a competing interest in the same phrase because it is said by him in a distinctive
and drawn out manner as his introduction." Id. at 839 n.5.
37. Id. at 839. However, Hoffman notes that the right of publicity protects more than
pecuniary rights. A celebrity also may object to exploitation on the grounds that the defend-
ant's use is embarrassing or offensive. Hoffman, supra note 2, at 117.
38. Carson, 698 F.2d at 839. See Hoffman, supra note 2, at 118.
39. Carson, 698 F.2d at 839. The dissent assumed that Carson played no part in develop-
ing the phrase "Here's Johnny." It is true that the phrase is spoken by someone else. How-
ever, the fact that Carson has used the same introduction over the years on different television
programs (and different networks) suggests that he has some personal control over the phrase.
See Carson, 498 F. Supp. at 73.
19851
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he made no personal investment in creating the phrase.'
The dissent also noted that unjust enrichment is adequately pre-
vented by federal and state trademark law. The majority had held that
Carson failed to meet the likelihood of confusion test required under
those laws. Thus, there was no need to grant Carson further protection
against wrongdoing. The dissent noted that the policies favoring the
right of publicity must be balanced against societal interests of free ex-
pression and free enterprise. This is especially true when the individual's
right is being expanded beyond the law's previous limits.4"
The dissent declared that Carson's right of publicity gave him a
common-law monopoly on the phrase "Here's Johnny." The phrase was
taken out of the public domain, "without extracting from Johnny Carson
a personal contribution for the public's benefit." 42 Such a common-law
monopoly did not require a formal filing with the government, as would
be required for a federal trademark, patent or copyright. This raises the
problem of notice. The majority's opinion expands the right of publicity,
the dissent said, going beyond name, likeness and performances to more
subjective attributes, such as a phrase used on Carson's television pro-
gram. This makes it difficult for the public to determine what aspects of
a celebrity's performance will be protected by the courts. Parties seeking
to use a particular phrase have no way of learning if the phrase will be
protected, unlike the implied duty to investigate a registered trademark.
Parties who want to use such phrases will act at their peril, and the result
will be "a chilling effect on commercial innovation."43
The dissent also noted that there is a federal interest in protecting
the public's first amendment right to freedom of speech. "Strong federal
policy permits the free use of intellectual property, words, and ideas that
are not protected by a valid copyright, patent, or trademark."" Trade-
mark law protects original works that fix the author's expression of an
idea or concept in a tangible form.45 However, according to the dissent,
40. Carson, 698 F.2d at 839. See Hoffman, supra note 2, at 118-19 (noting that wrongful
conduct hurts not only the celebrity, but also the public, which has been deceived).
41. Carson, 698 F.2d at 839. Hoffman notes that in many cases, celebrities have already
been generously compensated for their works and any additional compensation that is pro-
tected by the right of publicity is "more like the proverbial icing on the cake than a necessary
inducement." Hoffman, supra note 2, at 119-20. Hoffman suggests that celebrities often cash
in on their fame by endorsing products far outside the scope of their talent. "Joe Namath may
have enriched society with his glorious athletic feats, but the same cannot be said of his en-
dorsements of deodorant and popcorn makers." Hoffman, supra note 2, at 120-21.
42. Carson, 698 F.2d at 840.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 841.
45. See 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 1.08(c)(2) (1984).
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the phrase "Here's Johnny" is a mere idea or concept that should not be
entitled to trademark protection.
Carson has been subsequently cited, but none of those cases has fur-
ther advanced the definition of the right of publicity." While the major-
ity opinion in Carson strives to protect Johnny Carson's "identity" rather
than his name, the phrase at issue does contain Carson's first name. It is
still not clear if the right of publicity can be extended to those non-name
phrases, used by public figures, which so frequently work their way into
our national argot.47
Russell Clampitt
46. Carson has been cited in the following cases: University of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C.
Gourmet Food Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (likelihood of confusion test
not met when brand of cheese adopted name similar to university's name); Railroad Salvage of
Conn., Inc. v. Railroad Salvage, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 1014, 1019 (D.R.I. 1983) (likelihood of
confusion test is met in action to enjoin nearby defendant from operating store under a similar
name); Reeves v. United Artists, 572 F. Supp. 1231, 1233 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (professional
boxer's right of publicity not descendible); Westward Co. v. Gem Products, Inc., 570 F. Supp.
943, 945 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (plaintiff's manufactured products likely to be confused with those
of defendant).
47. Some examples of non-name phrases that have achieved notoriety are:
"Sorry about that, Chief.": actor Don Adams, as Agent Maxwell Smart on television
series "Get Smart."
"I'm a wild and crazy guy!": comedian Steve Martin.
"Yabba dabba doo!": cartoon character Fred Flintstone.
19851
2. Right Of Publicity Clarified
There's a saying in Hollywood that you know you've made it when
it's harder to keep your name out of the papers than to get it in. For
those trying to stop publicity, California has both a common law and a
statutory right of publicity.' This doctrine may be defined as the right of
an individual to have personal control over the commercial display and
exploitation of his or her personality and talents.2 A breach of the right
of publicity involves the unauthorized commercial exploitation of a per-
son's name, image, or likeness, as well as other aspects of identity, such
as biographical facts and one's actual performance.' Although a fairly
recent development, the right of publicity has received considerable at-
tention as numerous celebrities or their estates have sought to claim it.4
1. Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 416-17, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 346
(1983); CAL. CiV. CODE § 3344 (Deering Supp. 1985); see also Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316
F. Supp. 1277, 1279 (D. Minn. 1970) (right of publicity described as a common law property
right in one's identity). For a discussion of the statutory right, see infra note 7.
2. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.) (first
case to use and define the phrase, "right to publicity"), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
3. 2 T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, ENTERTAINMENT LAW § 19.01 (1983).
4. Such celebrities include: Pat O'Brien, O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th
Cir.) (no recovery for use of picture in beer advertisement), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1941);
Cher, Cher v. Forum Int'l, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982) (no recovery if advertisement
does not falsely claim endorsement); Elvis Presley, Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp.
1339 (D.C.N.J. 1981) (live stage imitation is protected); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,
579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.) (exclusive right of publicity maintained after death); cert. denied, 440
U.S. 908 (1979); Ann-Margaret, Ann-Margaret v. High Soc'y Mag., Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (right of publicity only arises when such use is for advertising or trade pur-
poses); Johnny Carson, Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir.
1983); Rolling Stones, Pat Benatar, Electric Light Orchestra, Santana, REO Speedwagon, and
Black Sabbath, Winterland Concessions Co. v. Sileo, 528 F. Supp. 1201 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (right
of publicity protects name of a group of individuals); Cary Grant, Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367
F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (right of publicity protects altered pictures); Groucho Marx,
Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (right of
publicity protects against the imitation of likeness by a live impersonator), rev'd on other
grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982); Howard Hughes, Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Urban Sys.,
72 Misc. 2d 788, 340 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct., Sp. Term, Part I N.Y. County) (right of publicity
protects use of name and biographical data for a board game), modified on other grounds, 42
A.D.2d 544, 345 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1973); Stan Laurel and Oliver Hardy, Price v. Hal Roach Stu-
dios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (imitation of name or likeness is a protected
property right); Guy Lombardo, Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernback, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620,
396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1977) (right of publicity protects unique style); Rudolph Valentino, Gug-
lielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979)
(proprietary interest must clearly outweigh the value of free expression); Agatha Christie,
Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (right of publicity not ex-
tended to a fictional movie); Bela Lugosi, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603
P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979) (right of publicity not inheritable).
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In Eastwood v. Superior Court,5 well-known actor and entertainer Clint
Eastwood became one of the latest to assert this right.
The National Enquirer published an article about Eastwood's al-
leged romantic involvement with two other celebrities. Eastwood was
pictured on the April 13, 1982, front page above the caption, "Clint East-
wood in Love Triangle." The same photograph and caption were also
shown in related television advertisements.
The article stated that Eastwood had angrily left his longtime girl-
friend, actress Sondra Locke, because she was pressuring Eastwood into
marriage. It continued that, during the separation, Eastwood met singer
Tanya Tucker and was "immediately smitten." Eastwood was then al-
legedly locked in a romantic triangle between Locke and Tucker, and the
two women were fighting over him.6
Eastwood's second cause of action was for commercial appropria-
tion of his right of publicity under both the common law and California
Civil Code Section 3344.7 The Enquirer demurred, contending that
Eastwood failed to state a cause of action. 8 It contended that it was ex-
empt from the statute because Eastwood's name and photograph were
not used to imply an endorsement and, even if they were so used, the use
was in connection with a news account. The trial court sustained the
demurrer without leave to amend. Eastwood petitioned the appellate
court for a writ of mandate to compel the lower court to set aside its
order.9 The court held that Eastwood's second cause of action was, in-
deed, defective, but that it could be cured by incorporating by reference
the scienter allegations in the first cause of action for false light invasion
of privacy. Accordingly, the court issued a writ of mandate, vacating the
lower court's ruling and granting Eastwood leave to amend.10
The right of publicity, commonly called "commercial appropria-
tion," was originally a form of the right of privacy.1" Although both
5. 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1983).
6. Id. at 414-15, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 345. Portions of the issue appear as an appendix to the
opinion. Id. at 427, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
7. California Civil Code § 3344(a) provides, in pertinent part, that:
[a]ny person who knowingly uses another's name, . . . photograph or likeness, in
any manner, for purposes of advertising. . . products, merchandise, goods or serv-
ices, without such person's prior consent . . . shall be liable for any damages sus-
tained by the person or persons as a result thereof.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (Deering Supp. 1985).
8. Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 415, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 346. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 430.10(e) (Deering Supp. 1985).
9. Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 416, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
10. Id. at 426, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 352-53.
11. California's common law right of privacy protects against four categories of invasion:
(1) intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; (2) public
1985]
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theories protect against the unauthorized use of one's name, image, or
likeness, the privacy theory seeks to compensate for mental and emo-
tional, rather than pecuniary, injury.12 The common law right of public-
ity may be pleaded by alleging four elements: (1) defendant's use of
plaintiff's identity; (2) appropriation of the plaintiff's name and likeness
to the defendant's advantage; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting in-
jury.13 The statutory remedy requires the additional allegation of the
knowing use of plaintiff's name, photograph, or likeness for purposes of
advertising or solicitation of purchase1 4 and a direct connection between
the use and the commercial purpose. 5
Eastwood's second cause of action only alleged that the Enquirer
had employed his name, photograph, or likeness without his prior con-
sent for the purpose of promoting magazine sales. The Enquirer argued
that Eastwood's failure to allege the appearance of an endorsement was
fatal to his claim.16 The court rejected this argument. California law
does not impose an endorsement requirement. 7
Relying on Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,18 the Enquirer further ar-
gued that appropriation of name and likeness for commercial purposes
could only be shown if the use had impressed the newspaper with a sec-
disclosure of embarrasing private facts about the plaintiff; (3) publicity which places the plain-
tiff in a false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the
plaintiff's name or likeness. Weinstein, Commercial Appropriation of Name or Likeness: Sec-
tion 3344 and the Common Law, 52 L.A.B.J. 430 (1977).
12. T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, ENTERTAINMENT LAW § 19.02 (1983).
13. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 117 at 804-07 (4th ed. 1971).
14. Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 417, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 347. The unauthorized appropri-
ation of a celebrity's identity must be for a commercial purpose in order to constitute a public-
ity violation. Chaplin v. Nat'l Brdcst'g Co., 15 F.R.D. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). However,
Professor Nimmer states a different view. In his article, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW &
CONT. PROB. 203, 217 (1954), he proposed reliance on the rule of damages, reasoning that a
defendant's unauthorized use of plaintiff's right of publicity for purposes other than advertising
or trade would usually be of minor value to the defendant. Hence, such unauthorized use
would result in only minimal damages for plaintiff.
15. Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 43 Cal. App. 3d 880, 895, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 370, 381 (1974). The Johnson court held that the defendant's use of an article, regarding
the plaintiff, in a textbook, was not so directly connected with the sale that it fell within Sec-
tion 3344.
16. Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 418, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
17. Id. at 419, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 348 (citing Stilson v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 28 Cal. App.
3d 270, 273, 104 Cal. Rptr. 581, 582-83 (1972) (use of name or likeness in advertisement
constitutes an invasion of privacy), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 952 (1973). The Enquirer's reliance
on Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 291 P.2d 194 (1955), and
Williams v. Weisser, 273 Cal. App. 2d 726, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1969), was misplaced. These
cases only held that the exploitation of another's personality for commercial purposes consti-
tuted an invasion of privacy. They do not limit the right of publicity. Eastwood, 149 Cal. App.
3d at 418, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
18. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
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ondary meaning.1 9 The court disagreed. It interpreted Lugosi as stand-
ing only for the proposition that the right of publicity is not descendible
and expires upon the death of the protected person. If, however, the
protected name had acquired a secondary meaning, it would be further
protectable as property under the unfair competition laws.20 But a sec-
ondary meaning is not required by either the common law or the clear
language of the statute.21
The court also rejected the Enquirer's contention that Eastwood was
not commercially exploited. It noted that one of the primary purposes of
advertising is to motivate a decision to purchase a particular product.
Therefore, to the extent the Enquirer's use of Eastwood's personality and
fame attracted the reader's attention, the Enquirer gained a commercial
advantage.22
The court then turned to the Enquirer's argument that the article
was a news account and therefore exempt from liability by California
Civil Code Section 3344(d).23 The unauthorized use of a celebrity's iden-
tity in connection with the dissemination of news or information of pub-
lic interest is protected by the first amendment of the United States
Constitution.24 Since most uses of a celebrity's identity do not fall
squarely within the category of either privileged news or unprivileged
commercial exploitation, courts employ a balancing test to determine the
existence of first amendment protection.25
This test involves weighing the competing interests of protecting the
right of publicity against the societal benefits of free expression.26 For
example, unprivileged uses have been found in the merchandising of
some aspect of the celebrity's identity in posters or games.27 Also consid-
19. Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 419, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 348. G&C Merriam Co. v.
Saalfield, 198 F. 369 (6th Cir. 1912), modified and affid, 238 F. 1 (6th Cir.), cerL denied, 243
U.S. 651 (1917), is often cited for its definition of "secondary meaning."
20. Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 419-20, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
21. Id. at 420, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
22. Id., 198 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
23. Section 3344(d) provides that "a use of a name ... in connection with any news,
public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or any political campaign, shall not constitute a
use [for purposes of advertising]." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(d) (Deering Supp. 1985).
24. Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 422, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
25. The first amendment "interest at stake-the right of free expression-is that of the
general public, not merely that of the individual defendant in a right of publicity case . ...
The public has an important interest to be served in free and uninhibited expression in all
channels of public information." T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, ENTERTAINMENT LAW § 19.21
n.l (1983).
26. Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 422, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
27. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (defend-
ants enjoined from selling posters and souvenir merchandise bearing Elvis Presley's likeness);
19851
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ered unprivileged is the imitation of a celebrity's performance.28 In con-
trast, interviews or the truthful use of a celebrity's name or likeness are
protected by the first amendment.29 This balancing is significant, as a
"proper accommodation between these competing concerns must be de-
fined, since 'the rights guaranteed by the first amendment do not require
total abrogation of the' . . . right of publicity .. .30
The court accepted that the purported romantic involvement of
Eastwood with other celebrities is a matter of public concern-which
generally precludes liability. However, Eastwood contended that the ar-
ticle and related advertisements were not constitutionally protected or
exempt from liability because the article was a "calculated falsehood."'31
The Enquirer argued that the article was, on its face, a news account and,
therefore, exempt from liability by Civil Code Section 3344, regardless of
whether it was true or false. The court completely rejected this argu-
ment: "The spacious interest in an unfettered press is not without limita-
tion."' 32  The court was simply unwilling to apply first amendment
protection when the entire article was allegedly false.
The question then became what standard of fault was to be applied.
The court adopted the standard used in defamation cases and concluded
that scienter, or "actual malice," is the applicable standard if the plaintiff
is a public figure.33 Scienter may be defined as either knowledge of falsity
or reckless disregard for the truth.34 This marked the first time that such
a standard has been applied to a right of publicity case.35
Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 96 N.J. Super. Ct. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (1967) (defendants
enjoined from using professional golfers' names and likenesses on a board game).
28. See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981). Broadcast of a
celebrity's entire performance has also been held not to be protected under the first amend-
ment. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Brdcst'g Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
29. T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, ENTERTAINMENT LAW § 19.21 (1983).
30. Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 422, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 350 (quoting Briscoe v. Readers
Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 541, 483 P.2d 34, 57, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 879 (1971)).
31. Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 423, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
32. Id. at 425, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
33. Id. at 424-25, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 351-52. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-91
(1967), has held not only that the factual reporting of newsworthy persons and events falls
within the constitutional protections for speech and press, but also that no redress is available
even for material and substantive falsification in such reporting in absence of proof that the
report was published with knowledge of its falsity or a reckless disregard of the truth. See also
N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (public officials required to demonstrate
defendant's "actual malice" in defamation suits).
34. Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 424, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 351 (citing Curtis Pub. Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162, reh'g denied, 389 U.S. 889 (1967) (public officials standard extended
to public figures). The Eastwood court's use of the term, "scienter," is, perhaps, preferable to
the imprecise term of art, "actual malice." See id. at 424 n.8, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
35. The court in Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
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The deliberate and reckless fictionalization of Eastwood's personal-
ity constituted commercial exploitation and was actionable when it was
presented to the reader as true. Although Eastwood's failure to allege
scienter rendered the second cause of action defective, it was
"[m]anifestly . ..cur[able] by amendment."36
Truthful accounts of celebrities are almost always exempt from lia-
bility under the first amendment. Also exempt are fictionalizations
presented in the media, provided that the fictionalization is apparent to
the public. The court addressed, for the first time, a right of publicity
case that dealt with the deliberate, nondefamatory,37 fictionalization of a
celebrity that was presented to the public as the truth.
Eastwood is significant in a number of respects. First, it clarifies the
ever expanding right of publicity. Second, its application of the "actual
malice" standard and liberal construction of the element of commercial
use suggests a broadening of remedies. A false account of a celebrity
might not amount to a defamation, but the celebrity/plaintiff might still
have a remedy under Section 3344.38
Moreover, when Eastwood was decided, it was "unsettled under Cal-
ifornia common law" whether a plaintiff could seek damages measured
by the profits of defendant, as well as by harm to him or herself.39 A
made cursory reference to the "actual malice" standard and suggested the possibility of appli-
cation in the appropriate publicity case. However, this was followed by Guglielmi v. Spelling-
Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 870-71, 603 P.2d 454, 461, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 359 (1979),
which clearly stated that the "actual malice" standard really has no application in a right of
publicity suit involving fictional works whose fictional nature is clearly apparent to the public.
36. Eastwood, 159 Cal. App. 3d at 426, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
37. This, of itself, can be a heavily litigated issue. See Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v.
Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 283-84 (1974) (Jack London's vituperative definition of "scab" in the
context of a labor dispute not defamatory); Rudin v. Dow Jones & Co., 557 F. Supp. 535, 536
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Frank Sinatra's attorney referred to as a "mouthpiece").
38. In Burnett v. Nat'l Enquirer, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 997, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206, 208
(1983), a piece in the Enquirer stated that comedienne, Carol Burnett, had acted boisterously
in a Washington restaurant, spilling wine on one patron and giggling, and " 'traips[ing] around
the place offering everyone a bite of her dessert.'" If behaving clownishly is how Burnett
earns her living, the Enquirer might have argued that an account of clownish behavior could
not be defamatory. Had such an argument prevailed, comprehensive pleading would have
supplied a fallback remedy under the statute for a false account of her activities, to the extent
that the Enquirer used that particular story to encourage sales.
The Burnett court also affirmed the trial court's finding that the Enquirer was not a
"newspaper," and, therefore, not entitled to the benefit of California's retraction statute, "for
purposes of the instant litigation." Id. at 1005, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 213-14. See CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 48a (Deering 1971).
39. Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 426 n.10, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 352 n.10. However, one of
the main rationales to support recognition of a right of publicity is the economic interest em-
bodied in the right. The exclusive grant of a publicity right in exchange for compensation
enables those whose achievements have rendered their identities commercially valuable to
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1984 amendment to Section 3344 resolves this issue. A plaintiff may
recover:
any profits from the unauthorized use that are attributable to
the use. . . . In establishing such profits, the injured party [is]
required to present proof only of the gross revenue . . ., and
the person who violated this section is required to prove his or
her deductible expenses. ' °
The 1984 amendment also provides expressly for the award of puni-
tive damages, as well as costs and fees to the prevailing party.41 Thus, a
right of publicity theory under Section 3344 provides not only an alterna-
tive remedy, but also considerable leverage in litigation.
Tammy K. Horton
"reap the reward of their endeavors.... ".Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Brdcst'g Co., 433
U.S. 562, 573 (1977). A celebrity's proprietary interest in the commercial value of his or her
name and likeness has been analogized to an author's proprietary interest in his or her copy-
righted work, id. at 575-76, and to a business's proprietary interest in its name and good will.
Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Further, the right of publicity
protects the celebrity's future earning capacity and the economic interest of those with whom
the celebrity has contracted for the authorized exploitation of his or her name and likeness. T.
SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, ENTERTAINMENT LAW § 19.01 (1983).
40. An Act to Amend Section 3344 of, and to Add Section 990 to, the Civil Code, Relating
to Privacy and Publicity, 1984 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 1704, § 2 (codified at CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3344 (Deering Supp. 1985), amending CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (Deering 1984)).
41. Id.
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